Not really an amazing book, but a great complement to the books published about the topic. The compilation of stories from the men who fought that day are crucial to understand the context and the battle from a down to earth perspective.
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The Battle of Mogadishu: First Hand Accounts From the Men of Task Force Ranger Kindle Edition
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“No matter how skilled the writer of nonfiction, you are always getting the story secondhand. Here’s a chance to go right to the source. . . . These men were there.”
–MARK BOWDEN (from the Foreword)
It started as a mission to capture a Somali warlord. It turned into a disastrous urban firefight and death-defying rescue operation that shocked the world and rattled a great nation. Now the 1993 battle for Mogadishu, Somalia–the incident that was the basis of the book and film Black Hawk Down–is remembered by the men who fought and survived it. Six of the best in our military recall their brutal experiences and brave contributions in these never-before-published, firstperson accounts.
“Operation Gothic Serpent,” by Matt Eversmann: As a “chalk” leader, Eversmann was part of the first group of Rangers to “fast rope” from the Black Hawk helicopters. It was his chalk that suffered the first casualty of the battle.
“Sua Sponte: Of Their Own Accord,” by Raleigh Cash: Responsible for controlling and directing fire support for the platoon, Cash entered the raging battle in the ground convoy sent to rescue his besieged brothers in arms.
“Through My Eyes,” by Mike Kurth: One of only two African Americans in the battle, Kurth confronted his buddies’ deaths, realizing that “the only people whom I had let get anywhere near me since I was a child were gone.”
“What Was Left Behind,” by John Belman: He roped into the biggest firefight of the battle and considers some of the mistakes that were made, such as using Black Hawk helicopters to provide sniper cover.
“Be Careful What You Wish For,” by Tim Wilkinson: He was one of the Air Force pararescuemen or PJs–the highly trained specialists for whom “That Others May Live” is no catchphrase but a credo–and sums up his incomprehensible courage as “just holding up my end of the deal on a bad day.”
“On Friendship and Firefights,” by Dan Schilling: As a combat controller, he was one of the original planners for the deployment of SOF forces to Mogadishu in the spring of 1993. During the battle, he survived the initial assault and carnage of the vehicle convoys only to return to the city to rescue his two closest friends, becoming, literally, “Last Out.”
With America’s withdrawal from Somalia an oft-cited incitement to Osama bin Laden, it is imperative to revisit this seminal military mission and learn its lessons from the men who were there and, amazingly, are still here.
–MARK BOWDEN (from the Foreword)
It started as a mission to capture a Somali warlord. It turned into a disastrous urban firefight and death-defying rescue operation that shocked the world and rattled a great nation. Now the 1993 battle for Mogadishu, Somalia–the incident that was the basis of the book and film Black Hawk Down–is remembered by the men who fought and survived it. Six of the best in our military recall their brutal experiences and brave contributions in these never-before-published, firstperson accounts.
“Operation Gothic Serpent,” by Matt Eversmann: As a “chalk” leader, Eversmann was part of the first group of Rangers to “fast rope” from the Black Hawk helicopters. It was his chalk that suffered the first casualty of the battle.
“Sua Sponte: Of Their Own Accord,” by Raleigh Cash: Responsible for controlling and directing fire support for the platoon, Cash entered the raging battle in the ground convoy sent to rescue his besieged brothers in arms.
“Through My Eyes,” by Mike Kurth: One of only two African Americans in the battle, Kurth confronted his buddies’ deaths, realizing that “the only people whom I had let get anywhere near me since I was a child were gone.”
“What Was Left Behind,” by John Belman: He roped into the biggest firefight of the battle and considers some of the mistakes that were made, such as using Black Hawk helicopters to provide sniper cover.
“Be Careful What You Wish For,” by Tim Wilkinson: He was one of the Air Force pararescuemen or PJs–the highly trained specialists for whom “That Others May Live” is no catchphrase but a credo–and sums up his incomprehensible courage as “just holding up my end of the deal on a bad day.”
“On Friendship and Firefights,” by Dan Schilling: As a combat controller, he was one of the original planners for the deployment of SOF forces to Mogadishu in the spring of 1993. During the battle, he survived the initial assault and carnage of the vehicle convoys only to return to the city to rescue his two closest friends, becoming, literally, “Last Out.”
With America’s withdrawal from Somalia an oft-cited incitement to Osama bin Laden, it is imperative to revisit this seminal military mission and learn its lessons from the men who were there and, amazingly, are still here.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPresidio Press
- Publication dateAug. 3 2004
- File size1.9 MB
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Product description
Review
“This collection provides enthralling reading about a sad chapter in American military history.”
--Richmond Times-Dispatch
From the Trade Paperback edition.
--Richmond Times-Dispatch
From the Trade Paperback edition.
From the Back Cover
"No matter how skilled the writer of nonfiction, you are always getting the story secondhand. Here's a chance to go right to the source. . . . These men were there."
-MARK BOWDEN (from the Foreword)
It started as a mission to capture a Somali warlord. It turned into a disastrous urban firefight and death-defying rescue operation that shocked the world and rattled a great nation. Now the 1993 battle for Mogadishu, Somalia-the incident that was the basis of the book and film "Black Hawk Down-is remembered by the men who fought and survived it. Six of the best in our military recall their brutal experiences and brave contributions in these never-before-published, firstperson accounts.
"Operation Gothic Serpent," by Matt Eversmann: As a "chalk" leader, Eversmann was part of the first group of Rangers to "fast rope" from the Black Hawk helicopters. It was his chalk that suffered the first casualty of the battle.
"Sua Sponte: Of Their Own Accord," by Raleigh Cash: Responsible for controlling and directing fire support for the platoon, Cash entered the raging battle in the ground convoy sent to rescue his besieged brothers in arms.
"Through My Eyes," by Mike Kurth: One of only two African Americans in the battle, Kurth confronted his buddies' deaths, realizing that "the only people whom I had let get anywhere near me since I was a child were gone."
"What Was Left Behind," by John Belman: He roped into the biggest firefight of the battle and considers some of the mistakes that were made, such as using Black Hawk helicopters to provide sniper cover.
"Be Careful What You Wish For," by Tim Wilkinson: He was one of the Air Force pararescuemen or PJs-the highly trainedspecialists for whom "That Others May Live" is no catchphrase but a credo-and sums up his incomprehensible courage as "just holding up my end of the deal on a bad day."
"On Friendship and Firefights," by Dan Schilling: As a combat controller, he was one of the original planners for the deployment of SOF forces to Mogadishu in the spring of 1993. During the battle, he survived the initial assault and carnage of the vehicle convoys only to return to the city to rescue his two closest friends, becoming, literally, "Last Out."
With America's withdrawal from Somalia an oft-cited incitement to Osama bin Laden, it is imperative to revisit this seminal military mission and learn its lessons from the men who were there and, amazingly, are still here.
-MARK BOWDEN (from the Foreword)
It started as a mission to capture a Somali warlord. It turned into a disastrous urban firefight and death-defying rescue operation that shocked the world and rattled a great nation. Now the 1993 battle for Mogadishu, Somalia-the incident that was the basis of the book and film "Black Hawk Down-is remembered by the men who fought and survived it. Six of the best in our military recall their brutal experiences and brave contributions in these never-before-published, firstperson accounts.
"Operation Gothic Serpent," by Matt Eversmann: As a "chalk" leader, Eversmann was part of the first group of Rangers to "fast rope" from the Black Hawk helicopters. It was his chalk that suffered the first casualty of the battle.
"Sua Sponte: Of Their Own Accord," by Raleigh Cash: Responsible for controlling and directing fire support for the platoon, Cash entered the raging battle in the ground convoy sent to rescue his besieged brothers in arms.
"Through My Eyes," by Mike Kurth: One of only two African Americans in the battle, Kurth confronted his buddies' deaths, realizing that "the only people whom I had let get anywhere near me since I was a child were gone."
"What Was Left Behind," by John Belman: He roped into the biggest firefight of the battle and considers some of the mistakes that were made, such as using Black Hawk helicopters to provide sniper cover.
"Be Careful What You Wish For," by Tim Wilkinson: He was one of the Air Force pararescuemen or PJs-the highly trainedspecialists for whom "That Others May Live" is no catchphrase but a credo-and sums up his incomprehensible courage as "just holding up my end of the deal on a bad day."
"On Friendship and Firefights," by Dan Schilling: As a combat controller, he was one of the original planners for the deployment of SOF forces to Mogadishu in the spring of 1993. During the battle, he survived the initial assault and carnage of the vehicle convoys only to return to the city to rescue his two closest friends, becoming, literally, "Last Out."
With America's withdrawal from Somalia an oft-cited incitement to Osama bin Laden, it is imperative to revisit this seminal military mission and learn its lessons from the men who were there and, amazingly, are still here.
"From the Hardcover edition.
About the Author
Matt Eversmann and Dan Schilling, along with Tim Wilkinson, Mike Kurth, Raleigh Cash, and John Belman, were Army Rangers and Air Force spec ops personnel in the task force involved in the battle in Mogadishu.
From the Hardcover edition.
From the Hardcover edition.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
Chapter 1
OPERATION GOTHIC SERPENT
Matt Eversmann
There were four blocking positions used by Task Force Ranger to surround the target building. Matt Eversmann was in charge of one of them, Blocking Position 4. The twenty-six-year-old staff sergeant had twelve Rangers assigned to his squad that day. There were several three-story buildings around the target, and Eversmann and his men would have to insert by fast rope. They were charged with setting the blocking position on the northwest corner of the target. Their job was very straightforward: isolate the target building so that no enemy could get in or out.
Most of all I remember the smell, that godawful, nasty smell. As soon as the ramp of the plane cracked open, that sick smell swept through the entire aircraft. It was disgusting-kind of like sulfur and something pretty rotten mixed on top. The smell, that lingering scent of burning garbage and who knows what, combined with the African heat was my welcome to Mogadishu, Somalia.
On August 26, 1993, I arrived at a small airfield on the Horn of Africa as part of a task force of soldiers who were given the mission to capture a local Somali warlord named Mohammad Farrah Aidid. At the time, I was a young staff sergeant with about five years' worth of experience in the Army. My first four years of service were spent in Watertown, New York, with the Tenth Mountain Division, and I had been with the Ranger Regiment only since March 1992. In my seventeen months of training with the regiment, I had deployed all over the world. We trained with the British Parachute Regiment in the United Kingdom. We traveled to South Korea to experience the harsh Korean winters and mountainous terrain. We even trained with the Thai Rangers in Lop Buri, Thailand. We traveled all over the globe to develop our combat skills. Now, after five years of good, hard training, I was on my way to battle.
Between August and October 2, 1993, Task Force Ranger conducted six combat missions. On our thirty-eighth day in country, we conducted our seventh and what would be our final mission. We launched a raid from our base at the Mogadishu airfield on Sunday, October 3, at around 1530 hours. That mission would go down in history as the fiercest ground combat seen by American forces since the Tet offensive in 1968. During what would become known to the men there as the Battle of the Black Sea, eighteen soldiers made the ultimate sacrifice, and some seventy others were wounded in action, many seriously. The killing resumed when one member of Task Force Ranger died during a mortar attack a few days later, on October 6. Much has been written and plenty said about that mission. I have read and heard about as much as I can about it and am convinced about one thing and only one thing: that mission-that horrifying event, that brutal experience, that episode of complete savagery-will be, without exception, one of the finest examples of American tenacity, selfless service, courage, and commitment ever witnessed in modern times.
Most soldiers, and infantrymen in particular, live with one question all the days that they wear a uniform. It doesn't matter if they are newly commissioned second lieutenants from the school on the banks of the Hudson or eighteen-year-old high school graduates right out of basic training. Somewhere deep inside their psyche, every single man who joins the infantry wants to know how he will react when the bullets start flying. When you get right down to it, I do not think I have ever met a man who didn't want to go to war in some way, shape, or form. Many wax philosophical about the thought of combat and all that it entails, but I've never met a guy who, deep down, didn't want to go for the test. Why else would men subject themselves to the endless hours of training? Why would they put up with the long periods of separations from loved ones? Why would they suffer for the low pay and the stress? Why would they push themselves to the extreme day after day? I can think of only one reason: to go to war, to get a shot at the title, to pass the final exam-whatever cliché one uses to describe battle. That's what soldiers do, I thought; that's why we exist, to go to war and win. At least, that is how I looked at it in 1993.
In December 1989 I was waking up at Fort Benning, Georgia, two-thirds of the way through Ranger School. My class had come back to Benning from the swamps of Florida to begin our two-week exodus for the Christmas holiday. Bright and early on the morning of December 21, 1989, the commander of the Ranger Training Brigade held a formation. With no introduction he said, "Last night we invaded Panama. The regiment jumped in to seize an airfield. Several casualties were reported." I was in shock. At that time, so early in my career, I didn't know too much about the 75th Ranger Regiment. I knew enough to know that if there was a fight anywhere in the world, the Rangers would be the first ones to go.
I fully expected that my unit, the 10th Mountain Division based at Fort Drum, had already been called to action, and I was upset that I was not with them. But I soon found out that all my mates were still in Watertown, away from the fight. We would have to wait for the next one. Interestingly enough, a couple of my Ranger buddies actually signed out of the Ranger Training Brigade for leave and wound up deploying to Panama for some follow-on operations with the regiment, resuming the last phase of Ranger School later on. I was amazed at their mettle: go off to war, do the mission, and then return to school. The word impressive hardly does justice to them.
When the Gulf War started, I was still at Fort Drum. I remember scheming with my roommate, Mike Evans, to get assigned to a unit that would surely get called to the fight. We desperately wanted to go to war, and felt stifled in the light infantry. I say this not as an indictment against the 10th Mountain Division. Not by a long shot. They were a very good unit. They just weren't suited for the mechanized, desert battle that we expected would take place an ocean away. Even though our forces would go on to decimate Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard, I was still zero for two.
In November 1991 I took the plunge and reenlisted for an assignment with the Ranger regiment. I flew to Fort Benning, successfully passed the assessment course, and was assigned to the Third Battalion. There are three battalions that make up the 75th Ranger Regiment. The First Battalion (1/75) is in Savannah, Georgia, at Hunter Army Airfield, the Second Ranger Battalion (2/75) is near Seattle at Fort Lewis, and the Third (3/75), stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, would be my new home.
I remember arriving at 3/75 as a brand-new staff sergeant with absolutely no special operations experience whatsoever. Though I had been to several good Army schools-sniper, airborne, Ranger, and SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape) school-I felt that I was still way behind the curve compared to my peers. It was pretty intimidating to assume a leadership position only to find that many of the subordinates were combat veterans of Panama. They proudly wore their combat infantryman's badge over the left breast pocket of their uniforms, and I heard the stories of the Rio Hato and Torrijos Tocumen airfield assaults that the men had been part of. Every day I would see the tiny gold stars centered on the suspension lines of their airborne wings. The "mustard stain," as we call it, signals a combat jump. They had been to the show. These men were larger than life, and I did not want to make any JV mistakes in front of them.
The best course of action for me, it seemed, was to listen and learn everything I could from these men. As I got to know the men of 3/75, I realized that they were certainly a different breed of men, a different caliber of soldier. Not necessarily better, just different. It was impressive to see young privates and specialists performing tasks that I previously would never have seen executed by anyone below the rank of sergeant first class. They were expected to perform difficult and dangerous things because that is what they would have to do in combat. Everything we did in that unit was focused on our combat mission. Young men were given a lot of responsibility and taught to be problem solvers. I heard the regimental commander, Colonel David Grange, say, "We teach these men how to think, not what to think." It was all starting to make sense.
More than anything, I was fortunate to fall ass backward into the arms of some very talented young men who took the time to help me learn the skills necessary to survive the rigors of life in the regiment. For that, I am eternally grateful.
I learned how to parachute out of airplanes in pitch darkness. We took marksmanship to a new level, and for the first time I started to really learn how to shoot my M-16. I learned how to use explosives, though I am definitely not the guy you want making the charge to blow the doors. I learned how to fast-rope out of helicopters in order to fight in an area otherwise unreachable by air. I learned how to navigate with a compass and by using the terrain. Most of all I simply . . . learned. Everything was new and everything was exciting, and I felt like sooner or later the chance would come to see if I could answer that eternal question.
Mathematically, I figured that since the First and Second Ranger Battalions had jumped into Grenada in 1983, in Panama in 1989, and Iraq in 1991, the longest I would have to wait would be five or six years. When describing the necessity of repetitive training, the command was fond of saying, "It is not a question of if we go to war, it's a question of when." Prophetic.
In August 1993, after a hellacious tour of the world, we landed in El Paso, Texas, for another training mission. On the night of a particular airborne mission, I remember that the battalion commander was not present for the parachute issue. As we rigged and began the jumpmaster inspection, someone said he'd overheard that th...
OPERATION GOTHIC SERPENT
Matt Eversmann
There were four blocking positions used by Task Force Ranger to surround the target building. Matt Eversmann was in charge of one of them, Blocking Position 4. The twenty-six-year-old staff sergeant had twelve Rangers assigned to his squad that day. There were several three-story buildings around the target, and Eversmann and his men would have to insert by fast rope. They were charged with setting the blocking position on the northwest corner of the target. Their job was very straightforward: isolate the target building so that no enemy could get in or out.
Most of all I remember the smell, that godawful, nasty smell. As soon as the ramp of the plane cracked open, that sick smell swept through the entire aircraft. It was disgusting-kind of like sulfur and something pretty rotten mixed on top. The smell, that lingering scent of burning garbage and who knows what, combined with the African heat was my welcome to Mogadishu, Somalia.
On August 26, 1993, I arrived at a small airfield on the Horn of Africa as part of a task force of soldiers who were given the mission to capture a local Somali warlord named Mohammad Farrah Aidid. At the time, I was a young staff sergeant with about five years' worth of experience in the Army. My first four years of service were spent in Watertown, New York, with the Tenth Mountain Division, and I had been with the Ranger Regiment only since March 1992. In my seventeen months of training with the regiment, I had deployed all over the world. We trained with the British Parachute Regiment in the United Kingdom. We traveled to South Korea to experience the harsh Korean winters and mountainous terrain. We even trained with the Thai Rangers in Lop Buri, Thailand. We traveled all over the globe to develop our combat skills. Now, after five years of good, hard training, I was on my way to battle.
Between August and October 2, 1993, Task Force Ranger conducted six combat missions. On our thirty-eighth day in country, we conducted our seventh and what would be our final mission. We launched a raid from our base at the Mogadishu airfield on Sunday, October 3, at around 1530 hours. That mission would go down in history as the fiercest ground combat seen by American forces since the Tet offensive in 1968. During what would become known to the men there as the Battle of the Black Sea, eighteen soldiers made the ultimate sacrifice, and some seventy others were wounded in action, many seriously. The killing resumed when one member of Task Force Ranger died during a mortar attack a few days later, on October 6. Much has been written and plenty said about that mission. I have read and heard about as much as I can about it and am convinced about one thing and only one thing: that mission-that horrifying event, that brutal experience, that episode of complete savagery-will be, without exception, one of the finest examples of American tenacity, selfless service, courage, and commitment ever witnessed in modern times.
Most soldiers, and infantrymen in particular, live with one question all the days that they wear a uniform. It doesn't matter if they are newly commissioned second lieutenants from the school on the banks of the Hudson or eighteen-year-old high school graduates right out of basic training. Somewhere deep inside their psyche, every single man who joins the infantry wants to know how he will react when the bullets start flying. When you get right down to it, I do not think I have ever met a man who didn't want to go to war in some way, shape, or form. Many wax philosophical about the thought of combat and all that it entails, but I've never met a guy who, deep down, didn't want to go for the test. Why else would men subject themselves to the endless hours of training? Why would they put up with the long periods of separations from loved ones? Why would they suffer for the low pay and the stress? Why would they push themselves to the extreme day after day? I can think of only one reason: to go to war, to get a shot at the title, to pass the final exam-whatever cliché one uses to describe battle. That's what soldiers do, I thought; that's why we exist, to go to war and win. At least, that is how I looked at it in 1993.
In December 1989 I was waking up at Fort Benning, Georgia, two-thirds of the way through Ranger School. My class had come back to Benning from the swamps of Florida to begin our two-week exodus for the Christmas holiday. Bright and early on the morning of December 21, 1989, the commander of the Ranger Training Brigade held a formation. With no introduction he said, "Last night we invaded Panama. The regiment jumped in to seize an airfield. Several casualties were reported." I was in shock. At that time, so early in my career, I didn't know too much about the 75th Ranger Regiment. I knew enough to know that if there was a fight anywhere in the world, the Rangers would be the first ones to go.
I fully expected that my unit, the 10th Mountain Division based at Fort Drum, had already been called to action, and I was upset that I was not with them. But I soon found out that all my mates were still in Watertown, away from the fight. We would have to wait for the next one. Interestingly enough, a couple of my Ranger buddies actually signed out of the Ranger Training Brigade for leave and wound up deploying to Panama for some follow-on operations with the regiment, resuming the last phase of Ranger School later on. I was amazed at their mettle: go off to war, do the mission, and then return to school. The word impressive hardly does justice to them.
When the Gulf War started, I was still at Fort Drum. I remember scheming with my roommate, Mike Evans, to get assigned to a unit that would surely get called to the fight. We desperately wanted to go to war, and felt stifled in the light infantry. I say this not as an indictment against the 10th Mountain Division. Not by a long shot. They were a very good unit. They just weren't suited for the mechanized, desert battle that we expected would take place an ocean away. Even though our forces would go on to decimate Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard, I was still zero for two.
In November 1991 I took the plunge and reenlisted for an assignment with the Ranger regiment. I flew to Fort Benning, successfully passed the assessment course, and was assigned to the Third Battalion. There are three battalions that make up the 75th Ranger Regiment. The First Battalion (1/75) is in Savannah, Georgia, at Hunter Army Airfield, the Second Ranger Battalion (2/75) is near Seattle at Fort Lewis, and the Third (3/75), stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, would be my new home.
I remember arriving at 3/75 as a brand-new staff sergeant with absolutely no special operations experience whatsoever. Though I had been to several good Army schools-sniper, airborne, Ranger, and SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape) school-I felt that I was still way behind the curve compared to my peers. It was pretty intimidating to assume a leadership position only to find that many of the subordinates were combat veterans of Panama. They proudly wore their combat infantryman's badge over the left breast pocket of their uniforms, and I heard the stories of the Rio Hato and Torrijos Tocumen airfield assaults that the men had been part of. Every day I would see the tiny gold stars centered on the suspension lines of their airborne wings. The "mustard stain," as we call it, signals a combat jump. They had been to the show. These men were larger than life, and I did not want to make any JV mistakes in front of them.
The best course of action for me, it seemed, was to listen and learn everything I could from these men. As I got to know the men of 3/75, I realized that they were certainly a different breed of men, a different caliber of soldier. Not necessarily better, just different. It was impressive to see young privates and specialists performing tasks that I previously would never have seen executed by anyone below the rank of sergeant first class. They were expected to perform difficult and dangerous things because that is what they would have to do in combat. Everything we did in that unit was focused on our combat mission. Young men were given a lot of responsibility and taught to be problem solvers. I heard the regimental commander, Colonel David Grange, say, "We teach these men how to think, not what to think." It was all starting to make sense.
More than anything, I was fortunate to fall ass backward into the arms of some very talented young men who took the time to help me learn the skills necessary to survive the rigors of life in the regiment. For that, I am eternally grateful.
I learned how to parachute out of airplanes in pitch darkness. We took marksmanship to a new level, and for the first time I started to really learn how to shoot my M-16. I learned how to use explosives, though I am definitely not the guy you want making the charge to blow the doors. I learned how to fast-rope out of helicopters in order to fight in an area otherwise unreachable by air. I learned how to navigate with a compass and by using the terrain. Most of all I simply . . . learned. Everything was new and everything was exciting, and I felt like sooner or later the chance would come to see if I could answer that eternal question.
Mathematically, I figured that since the First and Second Ranger Battalions had jumped into Grenada in 1983, in Panama in 1989, and Iraq in 1991, the longest I would have to wait would be five or six years. When describing the necessity of repetitive training, the command was fond of saying, "It is not a question of if we go to war, it's a question of when." Prophetic.
In August 1993, after a hellacious tour of the world, we landed in El Paso, Texas, for another training mission. On the night of a particular airborne mission, I remember that the battalion commander was not present for the parachute issue. As we rigged and began the jumpmaster inspection, someone said he'd overheard that th...
Product details
- ASIN : B000FC1V2E
- Publisher : Presidio Press
- Accessibility : Learn more
- Publication date : Aug. 3 2004
- Language : English
- File size : 1.9 MB
- Screen Reader : Supported
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- Print length : 272 pages
- ISBN-13 : 978-0345478566
- Page Flip : Enabled
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Honeybal LektorReviewed in Germany on November 13, 2013
5.0 out of 5 stars Überragendes Buch
Verified PurchaseDas vorliegende Buch enthält die persönlichen Berichte von sechs Mitgliedern der Task Force Ranger, die ihre Erlebnisse während der Operation Gothic Serpent im Jahr 1993 in Mogadischu schildern. Durch diese Perspektive ist das Buch sehr authentisch und das ganze Ausmaß und die Brutalität des Einsatzes werden sehr klar deutlich. Durch eine gut getroffene Auswahl der betieligten Soldaten, erhält man zudem einen guten Ein- und Überblick zu allen wichtigten Ereignissen während dieser Miltäroperation. Für alle, die interessiert daran sind, den Ablauf von Kampfhandlungen aus der subjektiven Sicht der Soldaten zu erleben und nachvollziehen zu können, die direkt daran beteiligt waren, ist dieses Buch genau das richtige, wobei auch die politischen und militärischen Rahmenbedingungen zur Sprache kommen, in deren Kontext "Black Hawk Down" stattfand. Kurzum ein sehr interessantes und "intensives" Buch über extrem harte Kampfhandlungen, das unter die Haut geht. Sehr zu empfehlen!!!
- bowonwingReviewed in the United States on December 1, 2017
5.0 out of 5 stars a really great book if you have any interest
Verified PurchaseThis is a really great book if you have any interest in "The Battle of Mogadishu," Rangers and "Special Forces" operations. It is surprisingly well written and contains poignant stories of the Battle.
Below is a book review in 2003 by "A Customer" for "Losing Mogadishu," (1995), by Jonathan Stevenson (which I thought was apropos):
"The book tells the story of recent Somali culture and Aidid's rise to power. The main points of Stevenson's argument revolve around how the U.S. lacked intelligence on what the real problems were in Somalia. He tells a story of clan warfare in Somalia where teenagers have grown up in the midst of gunfire; how 18 and 25 year olds are battle hardened soldiers. Stevenson asserts that while Somalis tend to hate members of the other clans, they dislike outsiders even more. There is no Somali nationalism except in the respect that they hate anyone who is not a Somali. The failure of the U.S. to understand these elements of Somali society culture led to many mistakes during the tenure of Operation Restore Hope. At the end of the book, Stevenson offers seven "lessons" the U.S. should take away from Somalia. They are the key portion of the book and are summarized below.
Lesson 1: Military Intervention is the Last Resort
All other avenues of solving the problem must be exhausted before turning to military intervention. U.S. and U.N. hopes for success were dashed when they stopped dealing with Aidid as a statesman and began treating him as a criminal. Stevenson writes that one of the realities of the Post Cold War era is that "terrorists become statesmen" and the U.S. only strengthened Aidid by casting him as the villain and blaming for all of Somalia's problems. The U.S. belief that getting rid of Aidid would get rid of the problems was naïve.
When intervention is necessary, Stevenson believes regional forces should handle the situation. He states that using regional forces is preferable because 1) free trade and regional stability will be promoted if neighbors are forced to deal with and solve one another's problems, 2) local solutions are likely to be less costly, 3) countries in the region will have more intimate knowledge of the problems and culture, and 4) should more intervention become necessary, regional resistance to outside intervention will be reduced because a regional solution has already failed.
Lesson 2: Know Your Enemy
The American view of the Somalis as intellectually, culturally, militarily inferior fits with the typical imagery of viewing a developing country as a child. Stevenson argues this kind of either ignorance or arrogance lead to unnecessary consequences in Somalia. The U.S. failed to understand that while Somalis loathe rival clan and subclan members, they loathe outsiders even more. They also did a sloppy job of military planning at the tactical level. U.S. helicopters flew the same routes and used the same formulas for their "snatch and grab" missions everyday-fly in and have Delta Force sweep the target areas while ringed by Rangers for protection. Thus, the Somalis knew where to direct fire to take down a helicopter and what to do once American troops were on the ground. American planners also did a poor job with translations on leaflet drops, provided little historical or cultural knowledge for the soldier on the ground, and did not comprehend the role khat played in lives of the gun-toting young men. Had the U.S. done a thorough job of examining Somali history and culture, they may have been able to avoid such mistakes.
Lesson 3: Establish Tight Command-and-Control
Decentralized command-and-control led to some unfortunate mishaps in Somalia. The U.S. had difficulty controlling arms flows to the Somalis because other states' peacekeeping forces took a much more relaxed approach to their mission, translating into a porous hole through which Somalis could smuggle arms or whatever they wanted. Different UNOSOM II factions had different rules of engagement, confusing the Somalis about what behavior was acceptable and what was not. Other fractured communications structures meant delays in reinforcements and wrong turns made by the convoy during the October 3 firefight.
Lesson 4: Let Soldiers be Soldiers
The argument here is that soldiers were not trained to act as a police force or mediators. Having to be passive does not mesh with what they are trained to do. Some soldiers even began dubbing their mission "Groundhog Day" because they repeated the same tasks day in and day out. Stevenson suggests interventions such as Somalia should be about compellance rather than deterrence. The U.S. military is trained to be aggressive and proactive, putting them in passive situations is asking them to do a job for which they are not prepared.
Lesson 5: Prefer Active Security to Passive Force
Very similar to Lesson 4, this lesson addresses the type of force that should be used in interventions as opposed to what soldiers types of actions soldiers should be allowed to undertake. Stevenson recommends less reliance on manpower and more on weaponry. The mistake in Somalia was applying the overwhelming force doctrine and only securing American compounds and distribution routes. What they should have been doing was securing territory and pursuing active disarmament of the Somalis.
Lesson 6: Keep Vietnam in Perspective
Riddled throughout the narrative in the earlier portion of the book are references to how politicians and military men alike wanted to avoid another Vietnam. Stevenson points out how Somalia's situation differed in many respects from that which American forces faced in Vietnam. He prescribes using small, mobile, technological units engaging in aggressive actions that stress agility, diversion, and the element of surprise.
Lesson 7: Plan for Decent Intervals
The notion underpinning this lesson is better planning on the transition phase must occur. Gradually phasing out U.S. soldiers and replacing them with a multilateral U.N. peacekeeping force would "allow the beneficiary population to be weaned of its dependence." Pulling troops out en masse makes it much more likely the country will experience a relapse. The U.S. must ensure that the U.N. is in a position to manage the situation before the U.S. abandons the area."
For general reference: "O2S4 MEC:"
Objective (Simplicity);
Offensive, Sprit of;
Superiority at Point of Contact (Economy of Force);
Surprise (Security);
Security (Surprise);
Simplicity (Objective);
Movement (Mobility);
Economy of Force (Superiority at Point of Contact);
Cooperation (Unity of Command)